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INTRODUCTION 
Circuit courts are split over the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), 
which addresses shifting of electronic discovery (“e-discovery”) costs at 
the end of the trial.1  Although the statute lists “copies” and 
“exemplification” as taxable expenses, federal courts of appeals and 
district courts interpret these words differently, with drastically differing 
                                                                                                                                     
† J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law, 2015; B.A., & M.A., with honors, Cambridge 
University, England, 1996.   With gratitude: For your inspiration - Nicholas Keller, Esq.  
For your support - Grace Patterson, Esq. For your guidance - Professor D. Michael 
Risinger.  For your constant encouragement - my daughters, Katerina and Gabriella Harte, 
and my sons, Sebastian and Benedict Harte. 
 1 The relevant part of the statute states: “A judge or clerk of any court of the United 
States may tax as costs the following . . . [F]ees for exemplification and the costs of making 
copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2014). 
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effects on the allocation of costs.2  The expense of discovery is 
presumptively borne by the responding party,3 but under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), parties can petition for relief from e-
discovery requests creating undue burden or expense.4  Courts are also 
required to limit discovery where possible,5 and, under Rule 54 of the 
FRCP, there is a presumption in favor of the award of costs to the 
prevailing party.6 
The federal statute focuses on the post litigation stage and does not 
refer to any agreements between the parties at the pre-trial stage.7   Courts 
have split over what types of electronically stored information (“ESI”) are 
                                                                                                                                     
 2 Compare Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 169 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (“The result does not depend upon whether the activities leading up to the 
making of copies are performed by third party consultants with technical expertise.  As 
expressed by one court,  ‘Section 1920(4) speaks narrowly of [f]ees for exemplification and 
copies of papers, suggesting that fees are permitted only for the physical preparation and 
duplication of documents, not the intellectual effort involved in their production’”) 
(quoting Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1428 (9th Cir.1989)); with Hecker v. 
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009), (awarding one of the defendants 
$164,814.43 in costs for “converting computer data into a readable format in response to 
plaintiffs’ discovery requests”) and U.S. Bankr. v. Dorel Indus., No. A-08-CA-354, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78096, at *13–14 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010) (awarding the defendant 
$27,171.88 under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3) for the creation of an electronic database that 
managed 800,000 pages of emails). 
 3 See Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (“[A] rough analogy 
might usefully be drawn to practice under the discovery rules.  Under those rules, the 
presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery 
requests.”); see also Adrian K. Felix, E-Discovery, Shifting the Costs of Compliance, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/
e_discovery_ shifting_the_costs_of_compliance.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2015) (“The general 
presumption is that the responding party will bear the costs of compliance with e-discovery 
requests.”). 
 4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 5 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(2)(C) (“[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of 
discovery . . . if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity 
to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is 
outside the scope permitted by R. 26(b)(1).”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise 
limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in 
the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, 
the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether 
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”). 
 6 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides 
otherwise, costs-other than attorney’s fees-should be allowed to the prevailing party.”). 
 7 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) (referring only to papers filed at the end of the case: “A bill of 
costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree”). 
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taxable and how much e-discovery is recoverable.8  The divergent 
opinions create unfair results for parties who are unable to recover the 
often prohibitive costs of that initially granted discovery.9  Uncertainty 
about the final costs of ESI threatens to deter litigants from pursuing a case 
and to push parties to settle early, regardless of the case’s merits.10  These 
outcomes are at odds with the American legal system’s goals of predictable 
outcomes, fairness in the litigation process, and equal access to litigation 
for all parties.11 
Parties decide what kind of e-discovery and how much e-discovery 
they pursue under the FRCP, but the court determines what costs are 
recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).12  The court’s role would be more 
effective if it enforced what the parties themselves agree to in e-discovery.  
                                                                                                                                     
 8 Michael D. Berman, Taxation of E-Discovery Costs Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1920(4) 
after Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, A.B.A.J. (August 14, 2012), http://www.esi-
mediation.com/taxation-of-e-discovery-costs-under-28-u-s-c-sec-19204-after-taniguchi-
v-kan-pacific-saipan// (“Nevertheless, courts have split on which e-discovery costs may be 
awarded to a prevailing party under 28 U.S.C. §1920(4).”). 
 9 M. Austrian, Taxation of Costs and Offer of Judgment, DRI (June, 2012), 
http://dritoday.org/ftd/2012-06F.pdf/13 (suggesting use of an offer of judgment to pursue 
a request for costs and noting “[a]n enormous divergence of opinion” among the courts, 
“with outcomes that range from almost complete reimbursement to total denial”); see 
generally S. Bennett, Are E-Discovery Costs Recoverable by a Prevailing Party?, 20 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 537 (2010). 
 10 Jon Kyl, A Rare Chance to Lower Litigation Costs, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2014, 6:21 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304049704579321003417505882.  
Kyl points out that the cost of, when not specifically allocated to the requesting party, can 
lead to a form of effective litigation bullying: “A federal committee wants to hear your ideas 
on the subject. Speak up. Nothing provokes as much dread in the mind of a CEO or general 
counsel as the words, ‘We’ve been sued in federal court.’ Once they hear an estimate of the 
litigation costs, many executives say, ‘I don’t care if we’re right, settle the case.’” Id. 
 11 See Shelley Podolny, Opinion, The Digital Pileup, N.Y. TIMES (March 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2011/03/13/opinion/13podolny.html (“[L]arge corporations face 
eye-popping litigation costs when they search for information that may be evidence in a 
lawsuit-so called e-discovery-that can add up to millions of dollars a year . . . the costs of  
can be crushing”); see also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, What We Do: 
Advocate for the Civil Justice System, https://www.justice.org/what-we-do/advocate-civil-
justice-system (last visited March 13, 2015). 
 12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A) (“Any designated documents or electronically stored 
information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, 
images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which 
information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the 
responding party into a reasonably usable form.”); but see 28 U.S.C. §1920(4) (referencing 
six specific types of fees that may be taxed: “(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for  
printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) 
Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the 
costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in 
the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court 
appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of 
special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title”). 
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Amending the FRCP and the U.S.C. to make discovery settlements binding 
and create a cost sharing process that reflects parties’ own agreements on 
discovery,13 is a practical solution that would reduce surprises and enhance 
fairness. 
This paper will examine the current state of cost shifting of fees 
associated with discovery in the post litigation context in federal courts 
and argue that the divergent results in current holdings warrant a novel 
approach with more court supervision or otherwise binding rulings on cost 
sharing of e-discovery throughout the litigation.  Section I gives a brief 
overview of the history of discovery issues relevant to the e-discovery 
debate.  Section II provides an analysis of the major cases and trends in 
the circuit split on the taxing of e-discovery costs.  Section III examines 
the rules and policies pertinent to this debate currently reflected in the 
FRCP and the U.S.C.  Section IV analyzes approaches to amending the 
rules that would provide more clarity.  Section V examines the suggested 
rule changes for e-discovery that various legal bodies have suggested.  
Section VI recommends solutions that address the legal and policy 
considerations discussed in the paper.  Finally, the conclusion summarizes 
the issues and recommendations. 
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF DISCOVERY ISSUES 
RELEVANT TO E-DISCOVERY 
Discovery, in particular electronic discovery (“e-discovery”), has 
broadened over time.14 The discovery process is more complex, and 
                                                                                                                                     
 13 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) ((1) In General. On motion or on its own, the court may 
issue any just orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b) (2) (A) (ii)–(vii), if a party 
or its attorney: (A) fails to appear at a scheduling or other pretrial conference; (B) is 
substantially unprepared to participate–—or does not participate in good faith–—in the 
conference; or (C) fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.”). 
 14 See generally Michael Junk & John McNulty, Leveling the Playing Field; Recouping 
e-Discovery Costs As Part of the Taxable Costs Awarded to Prevailing Parties ties Under 
28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW & STRATEGY (Law Journal 
Newsletter, Philadelphia, PA.), April 1, 2012, at *1, available at 
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_prodliability/30_10/news/156490-
1.html (“Document production: What once consisted of collecting a few hardcopy files 
from a relatively short list of ‘key’ custodians now typically requires the retention of 
litigation-support specialists to accomplish not only the imaging and production of 
hardcopy files, but also the identification, extraction and production of relevant 
electronically stored information (ESI) from computers, databases, servers, and even 
disaster recovery systems.  The age of ESI changed everything in terms of how quickly and 
easily documents are created and then stored.  As a consequence, every corporate defendant 
in a product liability case today can expect to spend thousands-if not hundreds of thousands-
of dollars producing documents in discovery.  Indeed, it is hardly an overstatement to say 
that discovery costs are staggering.”). 
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consequently more expensive, in cases requiring e-discovery.15  Although 
courts or parties can restrict discovery, this is not a satisfactory solution, as there 
may be information of great value to the case that can only be discovered 
by looking at a large number of data points.  E-discovery encompasses 
more sources than traditional discovery does; e-discovery includes: audio 
files, emails, social media postings, other forms of communication, and 
recordings of dealings and transactions that are relevant to the issues in the 
case.16  Dr. D. Michael Risinger noted in his article, Wolves, Sheep, 
Predators and Scavengers, that the purpose of promulgating the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure was to enhance access to the courts,17 and that 
one of the first proposed changes to the rules was to narrow the scope of 
permissible discovery and mandate a discovery conference.18  The 
proliferation of e-discovery, in contrast, pushes in the opposite direction. 
E-discovery differs from traditional discovery not only in terms of 
the actual rules that are applied, but also in its process and its cost.19  The 
Southern District of New York case, Pippins v. KPMG, demonstrates both 
of these aspects.  In that case, the court denied KPMG’s motion to maintain 
only a representative sampling of its hard drives when served with a 
discovery order.20  The court applied traditional discovery rules to allow 
discovery of all relevant information, failing to account for the enormous 
number of hard drives that had to be accessed in order for the corporation 
to comply.21  KPMG also implemented the traditional “American Rule” 
that each party pays its own costs in discovery.22  The American Rule is 
                                                                                                                                     
 15 See id.  (“According to one recent survey, for the period 2006-2008, the average 
company paid average discovery costs per case of $621,880 to $2,993,567.  Companies at 
the high end [of the scale] during the same time periods reported average per-case discovery 
costs ranging from $2,354,868 to $9,759,900.”). 
 16 See id. 
 17 D. Michael Risinger, Wolves and Sheep, Predators and Scavengers, or Why I Left 
Civil Procedure (Not With a Bang, But a Whimper), 60 UCLA L. REV. 1620, 1645–46 (2013) 
(“We have a right to a thrilling moment of self-congratulation as we contemplate the fact 
that in our federal courts we have come closer to making a reality of the right to equality 
before the law . . . . The Federal Rules swung the courthouse door wide open.”) (quoting 
Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3, 24–26 (1988)). 
 18 Id. at 1639–40 (“The most radical proposal was to change the language of Rule 26 
with the intent to narrow the scope of discovery (and perhaps indirectly raise the amount of 
detail required of pleadings).  The recommendations also included provisions for a 
mandatory discovery conference[.]”) 
 19 See Junk & McNulty, supra note 14, at *1. 
 20 Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377 (CM)(JLC), 2011 WL 4701849, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011), aff’d., 279 F.R.D. 245, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 21 Id. 
 22 See, e.g., Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a ‘Loser Pays’ Rule on the 
American Legal System: An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J.L. 
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well established as a uniform approach to encourage litigants to proceed 
without fear of cost shifting.23  But there is a huge increase in both the 
complexity of the process and the cost required to comply with its 
demands.24  In KPMG, the cost of preserving, producing and processing 
the data requested was $21 million.25  Therefore, simply adopting the 
American Rule cannot be a satisfactory solution. 
The KPMG discovery ruling has led commentators to point out that 
cases are settled early for more than they are worth.26  Charles Fax notes 
in his article, A Trend Towards Cost Shifting in Discovery: 
The warnings of pro-business groups like the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce that the KPMG ruling could encourage overly aggressive 
discovery requests and force inequitable settlements—hyperbole aside—
are not far-fetched. The KPMG ruling is consistent with a large body of 
case law.  This seems paradoxical because the discovery rules authorize 
courts to require cost-sharing where circumstances warrant.  Rule 26(c) 
permits a court, for good cause, to impose conditions on discovery, 
including, according to the advisory notes, “payment by the requesting 
party of part or all of the reasonable costs of obtaining information from 
sources that are not reasonably accessible.”27 
At the other extreme end of the spectrum of e-discovery rulings, 
courts deny e-discovery altogether.28  In United States v. University of 
Nebraska at Kearney, the Nebraska District Court denied the plaintiff’s 
motion to compel e-discovery based on their proposed search terms, 
effectively leading to no e-discovery.29  The magistrate judge in that case 
                                                                                                                                     
& PUB. POL’Y 567, 567–68 (2011) (discussing the “American Rule” and explaining that 
parties pay their own costs under this rule). 
 23 Charles Fax, A Trend Towards Cost Shifting in Discovery, A.B.A. LITIGATION 
NEWS (2013),  http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/civil_procedure/ 
051013-cost-shifting-discovery.html (last visited March 5, 2015) (“The American Rule is 
rooted in the belief that injured parties might not bring meritorious suits for fear of losing 
and incurring liability for the defendant’s legal fees, even if that risk is slight.  At best, 
plaintiffs might settle for less than fair value in an arms-length negotiation.  Public interest 
suits might disappear.  Thus, the belief holds, the American Rule promotes the ends of 
justice.”). 
 24 See Junk & McNulty, supra note 14, at *1. 
 25 KPMG, 2011 WL 4701849, at *1. 
 26 See Kyl, supra note 10. 
 27 See Fax, supra note 23. 
 28 See, e.g., United States v. Univ. of Neb., No. 4:11CV3209, 2014 WL 4215381, (D. 
Neb. Aug. 25, 2014), at *7 (“Having considered the allegations and docket filings, and 
absent any evidence that the defendants hid or destroyed discovery and cannot be trusted to 
comply with written discovery requests, the court is convinced ESI is neither the only nor 
the best and most economical discovery method for obtaining the information the 
government seeks.  Standard document production requests, interrogatories, and 
depositions should suffice—and with far less cost and delay.”) (emphasis added). 
 29 Id. at *1. 
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allowed only traditional discovery tools and denied e-discovery 
altogether.30  This response to the cost issue at stake in e-discovery missed 
several aspects of the debate, which could lead to an impeding effect on 
future litigation.31  Most cases today probably require some degree of e-
discovery because most files are stored electronically and most 
communication is done via electronic means such as e-mail.  E-discovery 
can be an efficient tool: professionals trained in appropriate search 
techniques can conduct narrow searches, thus allowing lower-cost 
discovery over a broader scope of searchable material. 
Turning back the clock to traditional discovery techniques ignores 
the reality of daily filing and communication techniques.  It also limits the 
scope of discoverable material by disallowing search term based sweeps 
of electronic files.  In the University of Nebraska case, the court noted the 
key problems with the e-discovery requests at issue were not the costs per 
se, but the parties’ failure to persuade the court as to cost allocation.32 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The history of the circuit split demonstrates that courts have been 
aware of the costs associated with e-discovery and that cost shifting may 
be necessary.  The 2002 case, Rowe Entertainment v. William Morris 
Agency, set the guidelines for future decisions by noting the excessively 
high costs of e-discovery and creating an eight-factor test for 
consideration in the cost shifting issue.33  The decision in Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC modified this test, favoring cost shifting and giving the most 
weight to the first two Rowe factors, dropping one factor, and weighting 
the rest in descending order.34  The factors as modified are: 
 
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover 
relevant information; 
2. The availability of such information from other sources; 
                                                                                                                                     
 30 United States v. Univ. of Neb., 4:11CV3209 (Dist. Neb. Aug. 5, 2014). 
 31 See United States v. Univ. of Neb., No. 4:11CV3209, 2013 WL 2146049, at *4–5 
(D. Neb. May 15, 2013) (referring only to the relevancy standard as limiting the scope of 
permissible discovery). 
 32 See id. at *5–6 (noting that it was “(i) the failure of the government to provide a cost-
benefit analysis or a ‘sound articulation’ of how this cost was required to comply with the 
plaintiff’s demands, (ii) the plaintiff’s failure to suggest reasonable cost allocation or to 
show a ‘reasonable likelihood of uncovering relevant or admissible evidence’; (iii) the 
overly broad nature of the scope of production in the government’s request for comparator 
evidence Act, which raised privacy concerns for parties unrelated to the lawsuit”). 
 33 Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 425–26, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 34 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322–324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
274 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 12:267 
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in 
controversy; 
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available 
to each party; 
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive 
to do so; 
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; 
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.35 
 
The Zubulake court also recommended the initial use of a data sample 
to determine whether the information in electronically stored format 
would be likely to promote the issues to be explored in the litigation.36 
In 2008, Congress amended the federal statute, which had previously 
only allowed for costs of “exemplification and copies of papers,” to 
include fees for “exemplification and the costs of making copies of any 
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.”37  
Courts are split over whether electronic document production for review 
is a necessity or a mere convenience for opposing counsel; the Federal and 
Seventh Circuits held that it is a necessity.38 
By contrast, the Third Circuit held in Race Tires America, Inc. v. 
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. that 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) only applied to the 
“scanning of hard documents, the conversion of native files to Tagged 
Image File Format (TIFF), and the transfer of VHS tapes to DVD.”39  
After the Race Tires decision, the prevailing party filed a petition for 
certiorari in 2012, asking the Supreme Court to define the scope of 
recoverable costs in the electronic document production context.  The 
Court denied certiorari, leaving the present confusion.40 
The change in approach to this issue was reflected in the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Country Vintner of North Carolina, LLC v. E. & J. 
Gallo Winery Inc., which limited “copying” to exclude almost all ESI 
charges.41  The Fourth Circuit held that the prevailing defendant could 
only recover fees from file conversion and transferring files onto discs, 
                                                                                                                                     
 35 See id. at 322. 
 36 See id. at 324. 
 37 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (4). 
 38 See Ricoh Co. v. AMI Semiconductor, 661 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that 
the Cost Statute extends to “all costs producing a document electronically”); Hecker v. 
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the award of almost $165,000 in 
costs associated with selection and conversion of ESI was allowed). 
 39 Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 40 Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. v. Race Tires Am., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012). 
 41 Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 260 (4th 
Cir. 2013) (following the Third Circuit in Race Tires). 
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resulting in the requested $111,000 fees dropping to $218.00.42  The 
Country Vintner court disallowed costs for: flattening and indexing, ESI, 
searching and data extraction, managing the processing of ESI, and 
preparing for production of documents to opposing counsel.43  The 
Country Vintner decision reflects the trend in Race Tires, which started the 
new move away from broad recovery of costs in e-discovery.44  The court 
in Country Vintner used the same reasoning as the Race Tires court, noting 
“a prevailing party may recover costs associated with copying or 
duplicating its files, but it may not receive reimbursement for any other 
ESI related expenses.45 
In May 2012, the Supreme Court in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan 
held that 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) prohibited the prevailing defendant from 
recovering as “interpreter” costs those that were associated with 
translating documents.46  This literal reading of the statute seems to 
indicate how the Supreme Court would rule if it chose to grant certiorari 
on the question of “exemplification” and “copying” under 28 U.S.C. 
§1920(4).47 
The Fourth Circuit in Country Vintner referenced the Taniguchi 
decision and the Race Tires decision, noting: 
We find the Third Circuit’s reasoning persuasive. The court properly 
took into account the statute’s history, its plain language, and the Supreme 
Court’s narrow contemporary interpretation of the costs taxable under 
§ 1920. [T]hese considerations support the conclusion that . . . subsection 
(4) limits taxable costs to . . . converting electronic files to non-editable 
formats, and burning the files onto discs.48 
                                                                                                                                     
 42 Id. at 261 (agreeing with the District Court’s reduction in fees.). 
 43 Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E & J Gallo Winery, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-326-BR, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108905, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2012). 
 44 Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 171 (“Here, neither Hoosier nor DMS obtained a cost-
shifting protective order. We are consequently limited to shifting only those costs explicitly 
enumerated in § 1920 . . .  [W]e conclude that of the numerous services the vendors 
performed, only the scanning of hard copy documents, the conversion of native files to 
TIFF, and the transfer of VHS tapes to DVD involved ‘copying,’ and that the costs 
attributable to only those activities are recoverable under § 1920(4)’s allowance for the 
‘costs of making copies of any materials.’”). 
 45 Country Vintner, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108905, at *8. 
 46 Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 1998, 2000 (2012) (holding that 
a “plain language” narrow meaning of the word “interpreter” meant that only oral 
interpretation costs and not document translation could be recovered). 
 47 See 28 U.S.C. §1920(4). 
 48 Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 260 (4th 
Cir. 2013). 
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But not all courts are narrowing the recovery of e-discovery costs.49  
In February 2013, a U.S. district judge in San Diego awarded $2.8 million 
in attorneys’ fees to the prevailing defendant, Qualcomm, for costs 
incurred in performing predictive coding.50  This decision suggests that the 
way that parties frame their e-discovery costs may affect the court’s view 
of whether they are recoverable.51 
III. RELEVANT RULES 
Judge Scheindlin significantly noted, “in an era where vast amounts 
of electronic information is available for review, discovery in certain cases 
has become increasingly complex and expensive.”52  The general rule in 
discovery is that the party producing requested documents shoulders the 
burden of the cost.53  But under FRCP 26(b)(2)(B), if the requested party 
can show that the e-discovery is not “reasonably accessible because of 
undue burden or cost,” 54 the requesting party must show good cause for 
production.55  In this case, the discovery need only be identified and not 
produced.56  At the end of the litigation, courts generally grant costs, other 
than attorneys’ fees, to the prevailing party under FRCP 54(d).  That is, 
“unless a federal statute, these rules [FRCP], or a court order provides 
otherwise.”57  The nature of the exact costs that can be shifted is not 
entirely clear due to courts’ different interpretations of “copies” and 
“exemplification” under the federal statute.58  There is currently a circuit 
split in the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §1920(4) regarding the nature of 
taxable costs to the losing party in the electronic production setting.59  The 
                                                                                                                                     
 49 See Ricoh Co. v. AMI Semiconductor, 661 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that 
the Cost Statute extends to “all costs producing a document electronically”); Hecker v. 
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the award of almost $165,000 in 
costs associated with selection and conversion of ESI was allowed). 
 50 Gabriel Techs. Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 08cv1992 AJB (MDD), 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14105 *35 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2013) (“[T]he Court finds Cooley’s decision to 
undertake a more efficient and less time-consuming method of document review to be 
reasonable under the circumstances. In this case, the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims resulted in 
significant discovery and document production, and Cooley seemingly reduced the overall 
fees and attorney hours required by performing electronic document review at the outset. 
Thus, the Court finds the requested amount of $2,829,349.10 to be reasonable.”). 
 51 See id. 
 52 Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, 685 
F. Supp. 2d 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 53 See sources cited supra note 3. 
 54 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 55 Id. 
 56 See id. 
 57 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d). 
 58 28 U.S.C.S. § 1920(4) (2014). 
 59 Compare Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1428 (9th Cir.1989) (taking a 
narrow view of allowable costs), with Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 
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statute states that the court may tax “[f]ees for exemplification and the 
costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily 
obtained for use in the case.”60  Attorney fees may also be awarded, 
however, they are not covered by § 1920.61 
“Taxing” refers to shifting some of the costs to the losing party at the 
end of the litigation.  A recent trend to narrow or fully restrict the shifting 
of electronic production costs has emerged.  The Federal Circuit, for 
example, has read “exemplification” to mean an official transcript of a 
public record that has been authenticated for use as evidence.62  As 
recently as February 2015, the Ninth Circuit, in Resnick v. Netflix, Inc., 
held that only the cost of copies necessarily obtained for use in the case, 
but not those obtained for the lawyer’s convenience, were taxable.63  But 
the Seventh Circuit saw the term “exemplification” as including a “wide 
variety of exhibits and demonstrative aids.”64  Nevertheless, after 
Taniguchi, federal courts of appeals generally follow a narrow reading of 
costs and exemplification.65 
Some academics propose that the Taniguchi approach should be 
universally adopted in cost shifting decisions.66  At the demand stage, it 
is common to grant broader access to electronically stored material than 
traditional discovery allows for hard copy.67  Consequently, preservation 
of electronic data is recommended, especially where there are policy 
                                                                                                                                     
2009) (awarding costs to defendant in the amount of $164,814.43) and Cefalu v. Vill. of 
Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 428 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding “no limits inherent in the term 
exemplification that would . . . preclude [a court] from compensating a party 
for . . . computer-based, multimedia displays,” and that “[t]his approach allows appropriate 
room for the more sophisticated types of multi-media presentations made possible by 
technological advances”). 
 60 See supra note 1 (noting the types of awards that may be made under 28 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1920(4)). 
 61 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)–(c) (2006) (awarding attorney and expert fees in civil 
rights cases). 
 62 See Kohus v. Cosco, Inc., 282 F.3d 1355, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that 6th 
and 11th Circuit precedent indicates that video costs would not be recoverable). 
 63 Resnick v. Netflix, Inc. (In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.), 779 F.3d 914, 
930 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that “the ability to conduct the review by looking at the original 
document establishes that the uploaded copy was not necessarily obtained for use in the 
case . . . . Accordingly, these charges are non-taxable under [28 U.S.C] § 1920(4)”). 
 64 See Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 427 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 65 See Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 260 
(4th Cir. 2013) and sources cited supra, notes 44, 45 and 59. 
 66 See, e.g., Emily Overfield, Shifting the E-Discovery Solution: Why Taniguchi 
Necessitates a Decline in E- Discovery Court Costs, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 217, 234 
(2013); Preston Register, How Much Do I Owe You For That Copy? Defining Awards 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (4), 65 ALA. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2014). 
 67 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[I]f a 
case has the potential for broad public impact, then public policy weighs heavily in favor of 
permitting extensive discovery.”). 
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interests at stake.  The amount of discoverable ESI material that parties are 
requesting is exponentially larger than that requested under traditional 
discovery.68  For many years, the legal community has noted with 
increasing alarm the nature of ESI as involving both great quantity and 
costs.69  ESI is more voluminous than hard copy, is not automatically 
erased even when deleted, and can be searched in many more ways and 
places than paper documents.70  E-discovery now includes: 
 
[1] voice mail; 
[2] e-mail; 
[3] deleted e-mail; 
[4] data files; 
[5] program files; 
[6] back-up files; 
[7] archival tapes; 
[8] temporary files; 
[9] system history files; 
[10] web site information in textual, graphical or audio format; 
[11] web site files; 
[12] cache files; 
[13] “cookies” and other electronically stored information.71 
 
The circuit split reflects the varying approaches taken by state and 
district courts.  Courts, following the FRCP, or similar state rules, may 
grant broad motions to compel production of all ESI documents that are 
likely to be relevant to the litigation.72  But some district courts are starting 
to restrict or altogether disallow these requests in order to limit cost.73  The 
                                                                                                                                     
 68 See Junk & McNulty, supra note 14, at *1. 
 69 See, e.g., Podolny, supra note 11. 
 70 See Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 97 (D. Md. 
2003) (“[S]ince ‘deleting’ electronic records does not actually result in their instantaneous 
erasure, but rather simply designates the file as ‘not used,’ thereby enabling the computer to 
write over it, courts have ruled that Rule 34 requests seeking ‘deleted’ electronic records 
are permissible.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 71 James W. McElhaney, Channeling Discovery, A.B.A.J., (November 2004), 
http://www.abajournal.com/ magazine/article/channeling_discovery. 
 72 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of 
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter 
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . relevant information need not be 
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”) (emphasis added). 
 73 See D.C.G. Sys., Inc. v. Checkpoint Techs., No. C-11-03792 PSG, 2011 WL 5244356 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011). Magistrate Judge Grewel used a model rule developed by 
the Federal Rules Advisory Comm. to address a “largely unchecked problem.”  Id.  The same 
judge later ruled in another case to limit search terms used in recovering relevant ESI in order 
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results therefore lack uniformity, and parties are at the mercy of the courts’ 
discretion.74  Legal professionals predict that “[i]f counsel and parties do 
not manage e-discovery effectively, courts will take control of these issues 
[and] fundamentally change the way we litigate.”75 
Many advocates in legal practice are coming together to demand 
clearer rules in this rapidly changing area, both at the cost shifting and the 
demand stages.  For example, in a recent law review article, Overfield 
requests that the Supreme Court articulate and mandate a test to clarify the 
scope of the terms “copying” and “exemplification.”76  But Overfield’s 
approach is limited to the notion of simply restricting recovery of e-
discovery costs in all cases.77  This fails to take into account those cases 
where large costs may have been necessary as well as proportionate to the 
issues in the case.78  Overfield argues that costs should be restricted under 
a narrow interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).79  A universal approach 
that is based on a narrow reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) may initially seem 
like a satisfying solution, but this leaves out the parties and their 
agreements and gives all the power to the courts.80  A recent tax court 
decision, Dynamo Holdings Ltd. Partnership v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, notes that parties should not delegate the execution of the e-
discovery process to the courts because: 
[T]he Court is not normally in the business of dictating to parties the 
process that they should use when responding to discovery. If our focus 
were on paper discovery, we would not (for example) be dictating to a 
party the manner in which it should review documents for responsiveness 
or privilege, such as whether that review should be done by a paralegal, a 
junior attorney, or a senior attorney. Yet that is, in essence, what the parties 
                                                                                                                                     
to address the “crushing burdens imposed on both the parties and the court by cases of this 
type.”  Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs., Co., No. C 11-1846 LHK (PSG), 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9921 *43–44 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012). 
 74 Steven Williams, Limit E-Discovery or the Courts Will, CAL. LAWYER 61, 62 
(Apr. 2012), http://callawyer.com/ Clstory.cfm? eid=921396&wteid=921396_Limit_E -
Discovery,_or_the_Courts_Will. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See Overfield, supra note 66, at 233. 
 77 See id. at 225. 
 78 See Overfield, supra note 76.  Overfield does not address the issue of necessarily 
large costs or their relationship to the issues in the case. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. at 235–36 (recommending that courts follow the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of exemplification  in United States v. Cefalu 338 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1964) 
(adopting  a “necessity” standard for reimbursing costs of copies and interpreting the 
“reasonably necessary” language of the statute to mean that the copy must be “vital to the 
presentation of the information”)). 
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are asking the Court to consider–whether document review should be done 
by humans or with the assistance of computers.81 
It is more practical, therefore, to amend the FRCP and the U.S.C. to 
make discovery settlements binding, and create a cost sharing process that 
reflects parties’ own agreements on discovery.82  This would reduce 
surprises and enhance fairness. 
IV. APPROACHES TO RULE CHANGES 
One possible approach to the problems discussed above would be to 
amend FRCP Rule 34 to specifically delineate what kinds of electronic 
format are permissible.  Currently, the request may be for any format that 
is reasonable.83  This list could be amended to indicate exactly what 
formats are reasonable, as well as what specific methods of copying and 
exemplifying these materials would be allowed.84  This list would thus 
specify what is a copy and what is exemplification for purposes of 
litigation, such that interpreting the language of the federal cost shifting 
statute at the end of litigation would be permissible.85 
Such an approach would clarify when courts can shift costs.86  Currently, 
federal courts can allocate costs to the requesting party under Rules 
                                                                                                                                     
 81 Dynamo Holdings L.P. v. Comm’r, 143 T.C. 183, 189 (2014). 
 82 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment (“However, 
in other respects particularly with regard to case management, the rule has not always been 
as helpful as it might have been. Thus there has been a widespread feeling that amendment 
is necessary to encourage pretrial management that meets the needs of modern litigation.  
Major criticism of Rule 16 has centered on the fact that its application can result in over-
regulation of some cases and under-regulation of others. In simple, run-of-the-mill cases, 
attorneys have found pretrial requirements burdensome. It is claimed that over-
administration leads to a series of mini-trials that result in a waste of an attorney’s time and 
needless expense to a client. This is especially likely to be true when pretrial proceedings 
occur long before trial. At the other end of the spectrum, the discretionary character of Rule 
16 and its orientation toward a single conference late in the pretrial process has led to under-
administration of complex or protracted cases. Without judicial guidance beginning shortly 
after institution, these cases often become mired in discovery.”) (emphasis added) (citing 
Nat’l Comm’n for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, Report to the President 
and the Attorney General (1979) and Pollack, Pretrial Procedures More Effectively 
Handled, 65 F.R.D. 475 (1974)). 
 83 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (a party may “serve on any other party a request that is within 
the scope of Rule 26(b): (A) any designated documents or electronically stored 
information–—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound 
recordings, images, and other data or data compilations–—stored in any medium from 
which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the 
responding party into a reasonably usable form”). 
 84 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
 85 See id. Additions to the list could include what forms of technology are acceptable to 
be produced and what methods of copying could be reasonable. 
 86 See 28 U.S.C. §1920(4) (2015). There is no list of what qualifies as copying or 
exemplification under the statute. 
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37(a)(5)(B4)(b) and 26(c) when the other party can show the information 
is not reasonably accessible.87  Some legal professionals advocate 
expanding this authority to make all costs go to the requesting party.88  But 
simply moving the cost allocation to the requesting party in all cases would 
lead to inequity in some cases, such as those of pro se litigants trying to 
find evidence for their own appeals. 89 
The FRCP was amended in 2006 to address the issues of e-discovery; 
these changes went into effect on December 1, 2006.  The amendments 
pertain to the planning and managing of discovery and the regulating of 
privilege and imposing of sanctions.90  They do not directly address the 
issue of cost shifting after litigation.91  Parties should be fully aware in 
advance of the consequences of their behavior with regard to ESI for 
recovery of costs after trial.  For these reasons, the rules should be 
amended.  Furthermore, the term “reasonably accessible” in Rule 26(b)(2) 
should be clearly defined instead of being left open to the courts to 
interpret, as should the term “good cause.”92 
Rules on sanctions in e-discovery are particularly important to the 
issue of cost shifting and in the failure of production.  The most dramatic 
example here is that of the Florida state court award of $1.45 million based 
on ESI sanctions in Coleman Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 
Inc.93 Rule 37(e) addresses bad faith requirements in its “safe-harbor” 
provision, which disallows courts from imposing sanctions for failure to 
                                                                                                                                     
 87 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(B)–(C). 
 88 See Kyl supra note 10. 
 89 See sources cited supra note 3.  The current presumption is that the responding party 
pays, but there would be problems for low income litigants if the rule were a blanket rule in 
favor of the responding or the requesting party. 
 90 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii)–(iii) (allowing the court to order pre-trial 
conferences and issue a scheduling order which may “modify the extent of discovery; [and] 
provide for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information[.]”); see also FED. 
R. CIV. P. 33 (discussing interrogatories and ESI based business records); FED. R. CIV. P. 
34 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment (“Rule 34(a) is amended to confirm that 
discovery of electronically stored information stands on equal footing with discovery of 
paper documents.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment 
(“Rule 45 (d)(1)(B) is amended to provide that if the subpoena does not specify the form 
or forms for electronically stored information, the person served with the subpoena must 
produce electronically stored information in a form or forms in which it is usually 
maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable. Rule 45(d)(1)(C) is added to 
provide that the person producing electronically stored information should not have to 
produce the same information in more than one form unless so ordered by the court for 
good cause.”). 
 91 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii)–(iii). 
 92 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
 93 See Coleman Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., No. 
502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005) (holding 
that defendant’s “willful disobedience of the Agreed Order justifies sanctions”). 
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produce ESI, where ESI was lost as a result of “routine, good faith 
operation of an electronic information system.”94  This provision provides 
little protection, considering the Coleman and Zubulake opinions and their 
successors.  Attorneys need to ensure that their document retention 
programs are fail-safe to avoid spoliation claims and sanctions, which 
courts can also impose through their inherent powers.  Accordingly, the 
rules must indicate the purpose of sanctions in the ESI context.95 
The relevance standard under Rule 26 includes a proportionality test 
that can limit the scope of discovery at the outset.  This test may reduce 
costs, but it does not address the issue of cost itself.96  The changed rules 
themselves indicate that committees have been trying to regulate the entire 
e-discovery process more strictly, but these changes fall short of 
demanding binding cost allocations on the parties prior to litigation.97  For 
instance, a change to Rule 16 indicates that courts expect attorneys to be 
ready for litigation, including being fluent in information technology (IT) 
                                                                                                                                     
 94 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 95 See George Kanabe & Jacob Heath, A Better Way to Litigate?- The December 1, 
2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Aim for More Efficiency and 
Less Delay, NorCal IP Blog, (March 27, 2016)   http://blogs.orrick.com/norcal-
ip/2015/11/11/a-better-way-to-litigate-the-december-1-2015-amendments-to-the-federal-
rules-of-civil-procedure-aim-for-more-efficiency-and-less-delay/ (This issue was 
addressed in the 2015 amendments: “Rule 37(e), as amended, will provides a uniform 
standard for courts to apply when determining how to address lost or missing ESI. If a party 
fails to preserve ESI and only upon a finding of prejudice, amended Rule 
37(e)(1) authorizes a court to order curative measures “no greater than necessary to cure 
the prejudice.” According to the Committee comments, curative measures may include: (a) 
forbidding the party that failed to preserve ESI from putting on certain evidence; (b) 
permitting the parties to present evidence and argument to the jury regarding the loss of 
ESI; or (c) giving jury instructions to assist in its evaluation of such evidence or argument.  
Amended Rule 37(e)(2) allows a court to undertake more drastic measures if it finds a party 
acted with an intent to deprive another party of the information. Those measures include: 
(1) presuming that the lost information was unfavorable to the party; (2) instructing the 
jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party; or (3) 
dismissing the action or entering a default judgment.”). 
 96 See Overfield, supra note 66; infra note 130 and accompanying text; see also FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“The elements of Rule 
26(b)(1)(iii) address the problem of discovery that is disproportionate to the individual 
lawsuit as measured by such matters as its nature and complexity, the importance of the 
issues at stake in a case seeking damages, the limitations on a financially weak litigant to 
withstand extensive opposition to a discovery program or to respond to discovery requests, 
and the significance of the substantive issues, as measured in philosophic, social, or 
institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public policy spheres, such 
as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have importance far beyond 
the monetary amount involved. The court must apply the standards in an even-handed 
manner that will prevent use of discovery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce 
a party, whether financially weak or affluent.”). 
 97 See Register, supra note 66, at 1105 (noting importance of agreeing on cost 
allocation at pre-trial conference). 
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and network architecture, so that the pretrial conference leads to 
agreements on what ESI is discoverable.98  Rule 26(f)(C)(3) demands that 
parties discuss the form of e-discovery to be used.  The notes from the 
advisory committee suggest there is a trend toward clearer enforcement of 
e-discovery agreements and cost allocation pre-trial, as Register has 
suggested as an important issue.99  Rule 26(a)(1)(C) addresses the need for 
timely initial disclosures, meet and confer rules, protecting third parties 
from excessive cost of discovery, and procedures governing disclosure of 
privileged or third party privacy protected information.100  The rules 
collectively purport to enforce some agreements between parties regarding 
e-discovery, early on in the litigation.  Amendments to the rules, which 
took effect on December 1, 2015, were aimed at limiting the scope of 
discovery and requiring parties and the courts to limit over broad 
discovery.101  Finally, amendments to the rules adopted in 2015 address 
the issues of excess costs and the administration of justice by requiring 
                                                                                                                                     
 98 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 addresses scheduling orders in pretrial conferences. Part (b)(3)(B) 
provides that “the scheduling order may . . . provide for disclosure or discovery of 
electronically stored information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B). 
 99 The advisory committee’s notes to the 2006 amendment demonstrate a move 
towards increased supervision of discovery schedules earlier on in the litigation, stating that 
“[t]he amendment to Rule 16(b) is designed to alert the court to the possible need to address 
the handling of discovery of electronically stored information early in the litigation if such 
discovery is expected to occur . . . . An order that includes the parties’ agreement may be 
helpful in avoiding delay and excessive cost in discovery.  See Manual for Complex 
Litigation (4th) §11.446. Rule 16(b)(6) recognizes the propriety of including such 
agreements in the court’s order.”).  See Register, supra note 66, at 1105. 
 100 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C) (requires that parties make initial disclosures no later than 
14 days after the Rule 26(f) meet and confer, unless an objection or another time is set by 
stipulation or court order. If parties have an objection, they should voice it early on). 
 101 See George Kanabe & Jacob Heath, A Better Way to Litigate?- The December 1, 
2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Aim for More Efficiency and 
Less Delay, NORCAL IP BLOG, (March 27, 2016)   http://blogs.orrick.com/norcal-
ip/2015/11/11/a-better-way-to-litigate-the-december-1-2015-amendments-to-the-federal-
rules-of-civil-procedure-aim-for-more-efficiency-and-less-delay/ (“[T]here are also 
several amendments affecting the scope of discovery in recognition of the significant costs 
that unfettered discovery imposes on modern companies. Amended Rule 26(b)(1) allows 
parties to obtain discovery of any non-privileged matter relating to a party’s claim or 
defense, so long as the proposed discovery is proportional to the needs of the case. 
Amended Rule 26(b)(2) requires courts to limit the frequency or extent of discovery if the 
proposed discovery is ‘outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).’ Amended Rule 
26(c)(1) allows a court to issue a protective order allocating expenses. Amended Rule 
26(d) allows parties to serve requests for production 21 days after service of the summons 
and complaint, regardless of whether the parties have held their Rule 26(f) conference. To 
coincide with the changes to Rule 16(b), amended Rule 26(f) requires parties to discuss the 
preservation of ESI and the possibility for agreements under FRE 502 during their 
scheduling conference.”). 
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parties to implement the rules to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”102 
Amendments to date have not adequately addressed the high cost of 
e-discovery or uncertainty with respect to allocation of discovery costs.  It 
is evident that further measures are necessary. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Academics, like the courts, tend to advocate the narrow interpretation 
of the cost shifting statute.  Register’s 2014 article advocates such an 
interpretation.103  Register notes that state statutes have taken varied 
approaches to cost shifting in association with copying, with Nevada 
allowing for any cost associated with copying, including labor.104  New 
Jersey, on the other hand, has limited shifting of costs for copying to the 
institution’s usual rate for making copies, or actual costs of films and 
photographs.105  On the federal level, the First Circuit decided that it would 
only award fifty percent of photocopying costs, stating that these were 
only taxable if they were “reasonably necessary to the maintenance of the 
action.”106  Using a different type of narrow view, the Tenth Circuit 
adopted a local rule that “necessary” copies should be taxed at cost, but 
set a specific monetary cap at fifty cents a copy.107  Noting these diverse 
examples of the restrictive view of how to tax e-discovery costs, Register 
posits that Race Tires takes the correct approach because it is reflective of 
traditional coverage of discovery procedures.  Race Tires limited cost 
shifting to: (i) converting files to easily searchable format; (ii) scanning 
documents, excluding costs of collecting and preserving ESI, and 
processing and indexing ESI; and (iii) keyword searching of ESI.108  
Analogizing e-discovery to traditional discovery questions misses the 
central focus of the debate: how to sustain a workable system of cost 
recovery given the large sums of money involved.  Traditional discovery 
                                                                                                                                     
 102 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  The rule previously applied only to courts. 
 103 See Register, supra note 66, at 1106. 
 104 See Register, supra note 66, at 1095 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712 (3)(b)(iii) 
(2000)). 
 105 N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:16S-1(b)(2) (2013). 
 106 See Register, supra note 66, at 1095 (citing Summit Tech., Inc. v. Nidek Co., 435 
F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 107 See Register, supra note 66, at 1096 (citing 10th Cir. R. 39-1). 
 108 See Register, supra note 66, at 1099 (“The narrow understanding provided by the 
court in Race Tires America offers a better alternative because it draws a clear line in the 
area of e-discovery. The line drawn is the same as previous versions of § 1920(4). The 
change in language for the newest amendment clearly allows e-discovery costs to be 
recovered. But only those items that are the electronic version of traditional copying costs 
are allowed. By limiting the costs to the narrower definition, the awards given are much 
smaller, which is in keeping with the scope and history of the statute itself.”). 
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simply does not cost as much as e-discovery and cannot provide us with 
satisfactory analogies for cost allocation purposes.109  Register also 
mentions briefly that parties can always contract to allocate cost.110  Other 
legal bodies are imposing a mandatory procedure to ensure that parties will 
in fact reach agreement on the cost allocation for e-discovery before 
proceeding in the litigation. 
Proposals to cap e-discovery costs have emerged recently.111  
Mazanec suggested that costs paid by producing parties should be capped 
at one-half of the claim in question.112  Mazanec noted that her approach 
would foster cooperation and allow parties to pursue litigation without fear 
of ending up with a prohibitive discovery bill.113  This fifty-percent 
proposition shields producing parties from exploitation, but fails to 
account either for the individual nuances of each case or for the costs that 
parties are willing to pay.114  Other proposed solutions aim to determine 
the cost allocation of discovery at different stages before the end of the 
trial.115  Professors Cooter and Rubinfeld suggest shifting costs to the 
requesting party once the other party has provided a certain level of 
compliance with discovery.116 
In a recent Wall Street Journal editorial article, Senator Kyl analyzed 
proposed changes to the FRCP, noting that some of the most significant 
changes in the package are aimed at reducing the cost and burdens 
associated with discovery.117  The three most important committee 
proposals are: (i) to provide a clear national standard which limits 
sanctions for discarding information that was sought in litigation to 
companies which have acted in bad faith; (ii) to provide a “narrower 
scope” for discovery, focusing on claims and defenses in each case instead 
of allowing discovery of any information that might lead to admissible 
evidence; and (iii) to confirm judicial authority under Rule 26(c), which 
allows courts to allocate the costs of discovery to the requesting party118  
A “requester pays” system would be particularly effective in 
                                                                                                                                     
 109 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 110 Register, supra note 66, at 1105 (“Even with a narrow reading of § 1920(4), parties 
are able to contract broader costs.”). 
 111  See, e.g., Karel Mazanec, Capping E-Discovery Costs: A Hybrid Solution to E-
Discovery Abuse, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 631, 634 (2014); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 455–56 
(1994). 
 112 See Mazanec, supra note 111, at 634. 
 113 See Mazanec, supra note 111, at 634. 
 114 See Mazanec, supra note 111, at 634. 
 115 See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 111, at 455–456. 
 116 See id. at 437. 
 117 See Kyl, supra note 10. 
 118 See Kyl, supra note 10. 
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accomplishing the goals of reducing costs and precluding overly broad 
requests, which have the effect of coercing the other side to settle.119 
Senator Kyl also noted that state bodies, such as the New Jersey Civil 
Justice Institute, are commenting on the proposed rules in a more favorable 
manner.  He stated that that there will be a significant reduction in 
litigation costs and trial delay if these rules are adopted.120  One way to ensure 
that the broader goals of Rules Committee are met would be an addition 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), referencing parties’ ESI pre-trial determinations.  
Such an addition would deter punitive litigation techniques by plaintiffs as 
they would face clear consequences based on pre-trial conference 
decisions or arbitration agreements.121 
Other effective solutions include the system used by the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory non-profit 
organization that operates under the oversight of the SEC,122 in arbitration 
proceedings.  Arbitrators regulate the entire discovery process.123  
Arbitrators can impose sanctions, including the shifting of costs for failure 
to comply or bad faith efforts to manage document production by the 
parties.124  The proposal requesting approval of these procedures indicated 
that they would help to limit what was noted as the large increase in 
discovery disputes, noting that they “encourage[] the parties to agree to the 
voluntary exchange of documents and information and to stipulate to 
certain matters.”125 Controlling discovery costs and enforcing party 
cooperation throughout the litigation ensures more fairness and leaves no 
room for surprise bills of up to millions of dollars. 
Several of the approaches discussed above seek to promote 
cooperation between the parties through increased regulation of the 
                                                                                                                                     
 119 See Kyl, supra note 10. 
 120 See Kyl, supra note 10. 
 121 Debra Cassens Weiss, Sanctions Will Deter Discovery Abuse, Qualcomm Magistrate 
Says, A.B.A.J. (Oct. 15, 2007)  (“‘If there isn’t some kind of sanction, there’s no 
deterrence,’ [U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara Major] said.  ‘How can this possibly be 
tolerated in the age of digital evidence?’”). 
 122 See Order Approving FINRA Proposed Rule Change Creating NASD Discovery 
Guide, 64 Fed. Reg. 49256 (Sept. 10, 1999) (approving use of arbitration procedures during 
discovery in customer cases). The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) was 
merged into FINRA in 2007.  See SEC Historical Society, The Institution of Experience: 
Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry, 1792-2010, Creation of FINRA 
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro06g.php. 
 123 See generally FINRA, DISCOVERY GUIDE, http://www.finra.org/sites/default 
/files/ArbMed/p394527.pdf (last visited March 23, 2016). 
 124 See generally FINRA R. 12511, Discovery Sanctions (providing for sanctions for 
non-cooperation in discovery under FINRA R. 12212); FINRA R. 12212 (specifying 
sanctions, including “assessing attorney’s fees, costs and expenses”). 
 125 FINRA Rule Change Creating NASD Discovery Guide, 64 Fed. Reg. 20036, 20036 
(proposed April 23, 1999). 
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discovery process throughout the litigation.  What is missing is a link 
between such cooperation and the eventual imposition of costs.  As 
discussed in Section VI, the rules governing discovery and cost allocation 
at both the beginning and end of litigation can provide such a link.  The 
amended rules should both require that parties decide on a very 
specifically delineated cost allocation and discovery schedule and reward 
those who cooperate during the proceedings by not imposing unexpected 
costs afterwards.  This approach does not eliminate the possibility of cost 
shifting, but instead recommends keeping the process under strict control 
by requiring the parties to agree on the basis and amount of costs to be 
shifted and enforcing that agreement through court orders. 
VI. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
A streamlined approach under the U.S.C. cost shifting statute from 
the outset of litigation to the post-litigation stage, with amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) governing e-discovery, would 
facilitate e-discovery while enforcing a workable scheme of cost-shifting.  
A re-worked set of rules requiring an enhanced discovery schedule and 
cost agreements would increase efficiency and create uniformity across the 
state and district court systems.  Alongside this new set of rules should be 
guidelines and detailed explanations for attorneys of the rules governing 
e-discovery and suggested methods for managing discovery.  One such 
method might be a multi-stage approach to arriving at a discovery 
schedule, perhaps beginning with samples of discoverable data from each 
set of electronically stored data sought for analysis. 
Furthermore, the new approach should include increased use of 
agreements that are binding on the parties, as they are in arbitration 
procedures required by FINRA during discovery.  Alternatively, there 
could be a judicially managed process such as a stipulation so ordered.  A 
binding agreement created between the parties as a pre-requisite to 
beginning the litigation process could then govern cost-shifting at the post-
litigation stage, given an appropriately amended rule under U.S.C. 
§ 1920(4).  This would obviate the need for a specified list of what can be 
considered “copying” or “exemplifying.”  Relying on definitions in 
statutes may lead to indefinitely divergent results despite a list, as judicial 
understanding of emerging technologies varies and there is ongoing need 
to update the list.126  The rule change would place the responsibility for 
                                                                                                                                     
 126 See e.g., Jason B. Bonk, Reasonableness and Proportionality Win Another Fight for 
Predictive Coding, (Sept. 17, 2014), E-DISCOVERY L. REV. (Sept. 17, 2014), available 
at http://www.ediscoverylawreview.com (follow “September 2014” hyperlink) (quoting 
Bridgestone Ams., Inc. v. IBM, No. 3:13-1196, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142525 (M.D. 
Tenn. July 22, 2014) (indicating that even where judges do understand the complexities of 
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cost-shifting on the shoulders of the parties, leaving the role of the 
judiciary to be one of enforcement of parties’ agreements, rather than one 
of individual courts’ interpretations of a long list of technical terminology. 
To remove doubt as to cost allocations for e-discovery, these changes 
to U.S.C. § 1920(4) would be echoed at the beginning of litigation with 
changes to the FRCP setting up the ultimate outcome of the potential cost 
shifting.  Specifically, FRCP 26(f)(3)(C) should be amended to make 
parties’ agreements binding as to what forms the e-discovery should 
take.127  Similarly, parties should also be required to agree on 
preservation of ESI, and that agreement should specify what to do when 
privileged or third party private information is inadvertently produced.128  
The current reference in FRCP 26(f)(2)(1) to preservation of information 
requirements is simply inadequate for the purposes of e-discovery.129 
With the changes suggested here, the reward for abiding by the 
discovery schedule, keeping effective preservation plans in place, 
providing broad access where it is relevant to the litigation, and keeping 
the scope of non-required discovery to a minimum, would be generous 
cost shifting reflecting the terms of the demand stage agreement.130  These 
ideas are in keeping with the requirement imposed by the rules that parties 
must sign all disclosures, requests, responses and objections with costs in 
mind.131 
                                                                                                                                     
technology, there will always be room for judicial discretion as to which technology should 
be used; the Bridgestone court issued a discovery order which allowed the use of predictive 
coding to narrow a document set that had been searched using keywords, while noting that 
“[t]here is no single, simple, correct solution possible under these circumstances”). 
 127 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C). 
 128 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (f)(3)(D) (“A discovery plan must state the parties’ views and 
proposals on: . . . any issues about claims of privilege or protection as trial preparation 
materials, including-if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these claims after 
production-whether the court to include their agreement in an order.”) (emphasis added). 
 129 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2) (“In conferring, the parties must consider the nature and 
basis of their claims and defenses and possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the 
case . . . [;] discuss any issues about preserving discoverable information; and develop a 
proposed discovery plan.”). 
 130 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. The current scope of discovery is general and broad, but the 
“relevance” standard of Rule 26(b)(1) is limited to some extent by the consideration of costs 
to the parties.  Rule 26 (b)(2)(C) expresses these limits: “[T]he court must limit the 
frequency or extent of discovery . . . if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is 
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; . . . (iii) the proposed discovery is 
outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Id. (emphasis added). 
 131 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(3). Attorney certification under Rule 26 (g) (1) (B) (3) is 
required to indicate “with respect to a discovery request, response or objection it is: . . . (iii) 
neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the 
case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy and the issues at stake in the 
action.” Id. 
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The suggestions of the Rules Committee and FINRA’s arbitration 
procedures contain important lessons.  The mandatory arbitration clauses 
recommended in the e-discovery context also grant maximum flexibility 
to the parties without jeopardizing the prospect of just litigation.  Clear 
FRCP rules reflecting the final taxation of costs under U.S.C. § 1920(4) 
would allow parties to pursue lawsuits in federal court without the fear that 
discovery will be stymied by concerns about paying for the necessary 
information.  This change would lead to predictability and fairness, 
provided that justification for the requested material is clearly stated at the 
outset and that parties agree to cost allocations.  It would also create 
uniformity across the circuit courts and affect how federal district courts 
and state courts handle ESI discovery requests and cost allocations. 
Some district courts have responded to requests for cost shifting by 
finding against the litigants on the basis of inaction and bad faith in failure 
to address the issue of discovery costs at the demand stage.  The Eastern 
District of Michigan held in 2008 that there would be no cost shifting in 
Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr.132  In Cason-Merenda, the defendant 
did not identify ESI under FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) as “not reasonably 
accessible” or file a motion for an order protecting it from burden or cost, 
but instead produced responsive ESI and then sought an order imposing 
half of its own costs on plaintiffs.133  The court denied the motion as both 
untimely, because the defendant had not raised the issue before incurring 
the costs, and inappropriate because the defendant conceded that the ESI 
was accessible, precluding any issue of good cause under FRCP 
26(b)(2)(C).134  Similarly, in a decision later affirmed by the Federal 
Circuit, CBT Flint Partner, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., the district court 
judge shifted discovery fees to the requesting party where the defendants 
complied with overbroad demands and the plaintiff lacked both early 
planning and good faith.135  The solution proposed here would guide 
parties away from incurring costs in the hope of post-litigation relief; most 
                                                                                                                                     
 132 Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. CIV.A. 06-15601, 2008 WL 2714239,  (E.D. 
Mich. July 7, 2008). 
 133 See id. at *1–3. 
 134 See id. at *3–4. 
 135 CBT Flint Partner, LLC v. Return Path, Inc, No. 1:07-CV-1822-TWT, 2008 WL 
4441920, *2-4 (N.D. Ga. August 7, 2008) (holding that a combination of bad faith and lack 
of early planning in the case to fairly share the enormous expense incurred in producing 
vast quantities of data formed the basis of the decision to shift the majority of the costs onto 
the requesting party. The court noted “the extraordinary demands made by the Plaintiff upon 
Cisco for document production, the costs incurred to date by Cisco, and the Plaintiff’s 
failure to demonstrate that the relevance and importance to the case of the documents are 
proportional to the cost required for their production.” The court further ruled that the 
defendant was entitled under Rule 37(a)(5) to an additional $86,787 which was 75% of its 
discovery cost.) aff’d, 501 Fed. Appx. 980 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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parties would agree on cost allocation in advance, and the court would 
simply enforce that agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The narrow interpretation on the part of some circuit courts of the 
words “copying” and “exemplifications” in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), which 
has led to their refusal to shift costs for production of ESI material, will 
lead to increasingly unequal litigation.136  Parties that face potentially 
crippling ESI costs will be deterred from bringing a lawsuit or going to 
trial. Uncertainty about post-litigation cost allocations broadens this 
effect to include many of those who would have recovered their costs.  
The two recently proposed solutions, that is, advocating a “narrow” 
interpretation of the statute or a rule change requiring the requesting party 
to pay all discovery costs, do not address these problems, especially for 
cases where an enormous volume of data must be sifted through.137  The 
current status quo is not likely to prevent e-discovery abuses either.  But if 
there are clear rules at the outset of the trial, and at the end of trial, then 
the parties can resolve question of cost shifting in a court-supervised pre-
trial conference process, and the court can simply impose the logical 
consequences of their agreement post-litigation.  Without a solid set of 
effective practice and procedural rules in place, however, the question of 
who bears the burden of e-discovery costs may become the deciding factor 
in the litigation outcome.  That result will never be a satisfactory one for 
the American justice system.138 
                                                                                                                                     
 136 See, e.g., Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
 137 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that costs of e-discovery lead to 
decisions to settle regardless of the merits of the case); see also Junk & McNulty, supra 
note 25, at *1 (“Skyrocketing discovery costs offend the very premise of the civil justice 
system, which is ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.’”). 
 138 See American Association for Justice, supra note 11 (noting that all Americans 
deserve access to the courts to “hold wrongdoers accountable”). 
 
